Jonathan Kvanvig has recently attempted to reconcile the problem of (apparently) pointless truths with the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted—that truth is always and everywhere valuable. In this paper, I critically evaluate Kvanvig’s argument and show it to be defective at a crucial juncture. I propose my own alternative strategy for generating Kvanvig’s result—an alternative that parts ways with Kvanvig’s own conception of the cognitively ideal.

According to the so?called swamping problem, reliabilist knowledge is no more valuable than mere true belief. In a paper called ?Reliabilism and the value of knowledge? (in Epistemic value, edited by A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard, pp. 19?41. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Alvin I. Goldman and myself proposed, among other things, a solution based on conditional probabilities. This approach, however, is heavily criticized by Jonathan L. Kvanvig in his paper ?The swamping problem redux: Pith and (...) gist? (in Social Epistemology, edited by A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard, pp. 89?111. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). In the present article, I defend the conditional probability solution against Kvanvig?s objections. (shrink)

The Swamping Argument – highlighted by Kvanvig (2003; 2010) – purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will always swamp the epistemic value of any non-factive epistemic properties (e.g. justification) so that these properties can never add any epistemic value to an already-true belief. Consequently (and counter-intuitively), knowledge is never more epistemically valuable than mere true belief. We show that the Swamping Argument fails. Parity of reasoning yields the disastrous conclusion that nonfactive epistemic properties – mostly saliently (...) justification – are never epistemically valuable properties of a belief. We close by diagnosing why philosophers have been mistakenly attracted to the argument. (shrink)

We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested by Kvanvig in The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003 and others) that if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of mere true belief, then we have good reason to doubt its theoretical importance in epistemology. We offer a value-driven argument for the theoretical importance of knowledge—one that stands even if the value of knowledge is (...) “swamped” by the value of true belief. Specifically, we contend that even if knowledge itself has no special epistemic value, its relationship to other items of value—cognitive abilities—gives ample reason to locate the concept at the very core of epistemology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar. By GERARD F. O'HANLON, S.J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pp. 246. $59.95 (cloth). O'Hanlon unfolds Balthasar's theology in four main chapters, which treat the question of immutability in terms, respectively, of Christ· ology; creation; time and eternity; and inner trinitarian life in God. In Chapter 5, O'Hanlon compares Balthasar's approach with some English-speaking authors (...) (B. Davies, A. Kenny, E. Stump, Kretzmann, P. Geach, J. Kvanvig, D. H. Mellor, A. E. Williams). Finally, in Chapter 6, O'Hanlon ofiers a summary and assessment of Balthasar's proposals. (1) Regarding his treatment of Christology in Chapter 1, O'Hanlon discusses how Balthasar's attempt to find a "middle way" between simple mutability and a traditional sense of immutability in God lies in uncovering the trinitarian presuppositions of Christology. Whether God is open to being afiected by dialogue with creatures hinges decisively on how we understand Jesus Christ or, more precisely, on how we understand the humanity of Jesus to reveal what God is like (9-10). This is an approach difierent from.that of those who would criticize the traditional axiom of divine immutability on the basis of certain philosophical assumptions regarding the priority of becoming over being (10-11). Balthasar's approach is first theological: when we con· sider the soteriological and eschatological dimensions of Christ's work for us, we are forced to ask the question about the nature of God: "does he too not sufier, is he not afiected by sin, can he he simply apathetic to the prospect of any final loss of his creatures to hell? " (9). At the heart of Ba1thasar's position, then, lies an affirmation of a kenosis within the inner life of God, which already provides a foundation for the possibility of the (second) kenosis revealed in the incarnation and the cross (11-14). That is, the "kind of emptying and self. giving we see in the incarnation is both the image and the effect of the eternal ' externalization ' of God that is involved in the intra-trinitarian life" (14). It is imperative that one see the nuances of this affirmation. On the one hand, Balthasar is careful to avoid a simple identification of the second with the first kenosis: this would make the incarna· 335 336 BOOK REVIEWS tion and cross natural and necessary to God, thus entailing theopaschism (14-15). On the other hand, the suffering love of Christ does truly reveal God's sovereign power to be absolute love and self-giving, because there " is a certain analogy between the divine and human natures of Christ which is due to the identity of the person, the pre-existent Logos" (14). Thus Balthasar is led to qualify the traditional understanding of divine immutability (15) : there is " some real kenosis within God which has ontological status and is not merely functional, soteriological, or a simple addition which does not affect God" {16). O'Hanlon makes clear how Balthasar is at pains always to respect the mysterious nature of the issue, as well as the limits set by the great Christian tradition. At the heart of the matter lies a return to the person -nature distinction as set by Chalcedon. Traditionally, the affirmation has been of a divine nature in Christ which remains immutable and a human nature which changes and suffers. Balthasar goes beyond this affirmation. On the basis of Philippians 2:5-11, he arrives at the necessity of positing a real kenosis in God ; and from his recognition of the ontological, personal identity of the Logos as the subject who unites the two distinct natures in Christ, he refuses to limit the change and suffering which Christ experiences to his human nature alone. In fact, the tendency to understand the human nature of Christ as an instrumentum conjunctum which does not affect the divine person he considers as Nestorian in character. Yet, at the same time, Balthasar affirms the incommensurable difference between God and the world, between the divine and human " unmixed " natures of Christ. The relation between the two natures is precisely analogous (after the manner... (shrink)

The first part of this paper asks why we need, or what would motivate, ameaningful expansion of epistemology. It answers with three critical arguments found in the recent literature, which each purport to move us some distance beyond the preoccupations of ‘post-Gettier era’ analytic epistemology. These three—the ‘epistemic luck,’ ‘epistemic value’ and ‘epistemic reconciliation’ arguments associated with D. Pritchard, J. Kvanvig, and M. Williams, respectively—each carry this implication of needed expansion by functioning as forceful ‘internal critiques’ of the tradition. (...) The second part of the paper asks what specific directions an expanded field of epistemology should take. While this is taken as an open question for debate, the expansion suggested here remains continuous with the analytic tradition, while also underlining the centrality of the acquired or ‘reflective’ intellectual virtues in meeting the burdens of the three arguments. Responsibilism, as here understood, is not a philosophical thesis so much as an orientation of commitment to clearing away philosophical assumptions that systematically obstruct recognition of the importance of empirically-informed research programs into the reflective virtues. (shrink)

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that “objectual” understanding, i.e. the understanding we have of a large body of information, cannot be reduced to explanatory concepts. In this paper, I show that Kvanvig fails to establish this point, and then propose a framework for reducing objectual understanding to explanatory understanding.

Can one still have understanding in situations that involve the kind of epistemic luck that undermines knowledge? Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009a; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009b) says yes, Prichard (Grazer Philos Stud 77:325–339, 2008; in: O’Hear A (ed) Epistemology, 2009; in: Pritchard D, Millar A, Haddock A (eds) The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, (...) 2010) say sometimes, DePaul and Grimm (Philos Phenomenol Res 74:498–514, 2007) and Grimm (Br J Philos Sci 57:515–535, 2006; in: Bernecker S, Pritchard D (eds) The Routledge companion to epistemology, 2011), Kvanvig’s critics, say no. The cases put forth by Kvanvig’s critics share a common feature, which seems to drive the intuition that understanding can’t be lucky: the fact that the information that makes up the individual’s understanding comes exclusively from a bad source. I formulate a case that lacks this feature, drawing on the fact that understanding produced from scientific inquiry is often produced by collaboration. I argue that my case provides good evidence that understanding is not a species of knowledge. (shrink)

Background Inadequate knowledge among health care providers (HCPs) and parents of affected children limits the understanding and utility of secondary genetic findings (SFs) in under-represented populations in genomics research. SFs arise from deep DNA sequencing done for research or diagnostic purposes and may burden patients and their families despite their potential health importance. This study aims to evaluate the perspective of both groups regarding SFs and their choices in the return of results from genetic testing in the context of orofacial (...) clefts.Methods Using an online survey, we evaluated the experiences of 252 HCPs and 197 parents across participating cleft clinics in Ghana and Nigeria toward the return of SFs across several domains.Results Only 1.6% of the HCPs felt they had an expert understanding of when and how to incorporate genomic medicine into practice, while 50.0% agreed that all SFs should be returned to patients. About 95.4% of parents were willing to receive all the information from genetic testing (including SFs), while the majority cited physicians as their primary information source (64%).Conclusions Overall, parents and providers were aware that genetic testing could help in the clinical management of diseases. However, they cited a lack of knowledge about genomic medicine, uncertain clinical utility, and lack of available learning resources as barriers. The knowledge gained from this study will assist with developing guidelines and policies to guide providers on the return of SFs in sub-Saharan Africa and across the continent. (shrink)

This volume comprises systematic as well as historical essays, including contributions intended to give comprehensive overviews of such areas as genetic phenomenology, transcendental phenomenology, philosophy and history of logic and mathematics, Kant, hermeneutics, Hegel, and philosophy of language. The book is addressed to phenomenologists, particularly those who are interested in some or all of the areas mentioned. In his introduction Joseph J. Kockelmans indicates that these diverse areas enter into dialogue in the work of Thomas M. Seebohm, whom the editors (...) and authors wish to honor, and the systematic papers mirror the state of the art of research in the above-mentioned disciplines. (shrink)

Multiple accounts of how theories of human psychology and of image-making influenced each other in a decisive period in the history of philosophy and art.

Christians hold that God is transcendent, that He is other than all else that exists. For example, Paul Tillich claims, The divine beings and the Supreme Being, God, are representations of that which is ultimately referred to in the religious act. They are representations, for the unconditioned transcendent surpasses every possible conception of a being, including even the conception of a Supreme Being … It is the religious function of atheism ever to remind us that the religious act has to (...) do with the unconditioned transcendent, and that the representations of the Unconditioned are not objects concerning whose existence … a discussion would be possible. (shrink)

This article indicates some ways in which the fantasy of the brain in the vat has been used in thought experiments to discuss important philosophical problems. The first has to do with scepticism about the external world. The second has to do with Hilary Putnam’s arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and his rejection of metaphysical realism. The third issue to which the brain in the vat is relevant has to do with the difference between broad and narrow content of (...) beliefs and Putnam’s challenging assertion that reference is not ‘in the head’. Though there are brief suggestions for dealing with these problems and saving metaphysical realism, the main purpose is to indicate the relevance of the fantasy of the brain in the vat to discussion of these issues. (shrink)

Old Assyrian Legal Practices: Law and Dispute in the Ancient Near East. By Thomas Klitgaard Hertel. PIHANS, vol. 123. Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 2013. Pp. xlii + 479. €84.80.

A review of E.J. Lowe and Ontology, Edited By Mirosław Szatkowski. (New York, Oxford: Routledge, 2022. Pp. 326. Price £130.00.).

Le but de cet article est d'examiner à fonds les relations qu'il y a entre les données de la science sur la matière et l'énergie, et les notions philosophiques de substance et d'accident. Il s'agit ici spécialement des deux questions suivantes : d'abord, doit-ön appeler vraiment exacte l'expression : « la matière se transforme en énergie » et ensuite : peut-on vraiment dire qu'il n'y ait pas de matière dans l'espace vide d'air ? C'est de propos délibéré que nous avons (...) choisi pour l'étude de ces questions la méthode qui consiste à interroger, autant que possible, les données mêmes de la science. Nous esquissons dès lors rapidement dans la première partie de l'article les théories physiques concernant notre sujet. Puis, dans la seconde partie, nous essayons d'en donner une interprétation. Cette interprétation met en lumière l'intuition plus profonde, qui se cache dans la connaissance du physicien, et qui ne saurait s'exprimer d'une manière achevée dans le cadre de la théorie physique comme telle. Il est nécessaire dès lors de donner une notion exacte de la substance. Tout physicien d'ailleurs tient implicitement compte de cette notion, dès qu'il ne se contente plus seulement des seules formules, mais qu'il y ajoute des explications. On doit toutefois circonscrire avec un soin particulier le sens attaché à la notion de « substance matérielle ». Il ne faudra pas par exemple trop insister sur l'occupation d'une certaine partie de l'espace bien tranchée. On doit aussi éviter une espèce d'anthropomorphisme dans laquelle on attribuerait à la substance matérielle une intériorité ou une indépendance trop grandes. Nous espérons être arrivé ainsi à des conclusions fondamentales sur la notion de la substance matérielle, ainsi que sur la nature de l'espace appelé vide. (shrink)

Peut-être que jusqu'ici dans les recherches philosophiques sur la nature du temps on a attribué trop peu d'attention à la distinction entre « temps » comme catégorie mathématique d'une part, et « temps » comme il est réalisé dans des processus et des périodes d'autre part. Quand on essaie de combler ce vide, on éprouve le besoin d'impliquer dans ses considérations l'apparition fréquente de « nouveauté » et de « commencement ». C'est pourquoi on examine dans la première partie de (...) cet article comment nous nous formons une notion mathématique du temps. Il apparaît que cela se fait en idéalisant la perception des périodes. On s'imagine que l'unité du temps une fois choisie peut être reproduite exactement, et même jusqu'à l'inñni. En outre on s'imagine que chaque période peut être divisée en des intervalles arbitrairement petits. Un instant est pensé comme une limite nette entre le temps qui précède et le temps qui suit ; ici la séparation entre les deux parties du temps est posée comme absolue contre arrière-plan d'un temps dont justement la cohérence est posée comme absolue. C'est ainsi que naît la catégorie du temps comme une possibilité homogène, toujours égale à elle-même pour indiquer des instants indivisibles et pour délimiter des périodes, à savoir une possibilité qui s'étend sans limites des deux côtés de l'instant actuel, aussi bien vers l'avenir que vers le passé. Quand on indique un instant, deux notions contradictoires sont posées en même temps, à savoir une séparation absolue et une cohérence absolue. Dans la physique ce schéma mathématique s'avère extrêmement utile. Pourtant il s'agit de se rendre toujours compte de l'applicabilité défectueuse de ce schéma, de sorte qu'on fasse attention aux complications qui exigent un complément et une correction de la théorie. Quand on applique le même schéma aussi aux processus vitaux et aux événements psychiques, alors l'incohérence entre le schéma mathématique et la succession réelle des périodes se trouve encore plus grande. Dans la deuxième partie on analyse le « commencement ». De la manière la plus originelle un commencement se présente devant nous, quand nous essayons d'avoir une vue d'ensemble de notre propre vie, comme elle se trouve dans notre mémoire. Dans le passé nous rencontrons alors une frontière que nous ne pouvons pas marquer cependant nettement sur une échelle mathématique. Ainsi en analysant chaque commencement on doit distinguer de nouveau soigneusement le commencement dans le domaine mathématique de celui dans l'ordre réel. Le caractère abrupt qui est propre à un commencement « mathématique » se trouve absent dans un commencement « réel ». Dans la troisième partie il est démontré que le temps et le commencement sont inséparablement liés l'un à l'autre. Le temps réel apparaît partout dans des périodes ayant un commencement et ainsi dans un ensemble compliqué de commencement et de permanence. Toutes les totalités dans la nature vivante et dans la nature inanimée, les individus ainsi que les espèces, ont été neuves une fois. Avant ce commencement multiple notre univers a été neuf. Cependant, alors il appert que cette mesure perd son utilité. Lorsque l'univers était encore en gestation, notre temps, lui aussi, avec sa mesure était en formation. C'est pourquoi une localisation exacte du commencement de l'univers sur l'échelle du temps n'est pas seulement impossible, mais même absurde. Cependant, si un commencement ne peut jamais être déñni de façon mathématique, il est pourtant défini de sa manière particulière dans le temps, c'est à dire par une définition qui essentiellement contient une certaine imprécision. Quant au commencement de l'univers les sciences physiques conduisent par des chemins différents à un même résultat, et font conclure à un âge de l'univers de quatre milliards et demi d'années environ. Finalement une question concernant la notion de création se présente. La tradition connaît en effet une notion de création dans un sens très stricte, distinguée des notions de « conservatio » et de « concursus ». On a l'habitude de lier le fait de la création à un seul ou à quelques instants. Mais nous croyons pouvoir démontrer que dans la dépendance que les créatures ont a l'égard du Créateur, il y a toujours aussi un aspect d' « être créé » dans le sens cité plus haut, un aspect qui se met d'autant plus au premier rang qu'il y a plus de nouveauté et de discontinuité vis à vis du passé. (shrink)